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THE NEW ARTICLE NINE OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE: AN INTRODUCTION AND CRITIQUE
William C. Headrick*
Part I
INTRODUCTION
Of all the nine articles which comprise the Uniform Commercial
Code, the last one is clearly the most innovative and the most valuable.
Even the Review Committee set up to correct its shortcomings began
its General Comment by admitting that fact. Its value resides in the
enormous progress it accomplishes over preceding statutes and in the
wisdom of its policies. It does not reside in the neatness of its technique
nor in the clarity of its draftsmanship. Hence the paradox that this
most valuable article is the only one requiring a complete overhaul,
though it is also true that the overhaul was limited, with very few
exceptions, to correcting mistakes and ambiguities of draftsmanship.
What I shall from now on call the old Code or the old Article Nine
has five great merits in addition to numerous minor ones: First, it
groups all types of security interests together in one comprehensive
scheme and provides a single filing system for all of them. Second, it
establishes a number of rules common to all of these types, especially
with regard to validity and default, thus bringing about simplicity
wherever simplicity was possible. Third, it establishes a comprehensive
body of rules which attempt to regulate priorities among competing
secured creditors. Fourth, it absorbs the sale of accounts receivable and
chattel paper, governing them in many respects (validity, perfection,
proceeds, priorities) as if they were transactions intended for security.
And last, it abolishes with one courageous stroke of the pen a long line
of cases, of which Benedict v. Ratner' was the reductio ad absurdum, which
required the creditor to police his collateral when it consisted of inven-
tory or accounts receivable, on pain of having his security interest found
fraudulent and void. (Section 9-205.)
The old Article Nine has two offsetting demerits which are in them-
selves sufficient to justify its revision, quite apart from its numerous de-
ficiencies of draftsmanship. These demerits were seriously undermining
both real estate financing of fixtures and accounts receivable financing
in general. A mortgagee who financed fixtures as a part of the con-
struction of a building could see his rights to these fixtures defeated
by a purchase money creditor who filed later. And an accounts financer
could be subordinated by later purchase money and chattel mortgage
*visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Montana. B.A., Swarthmore
Oollege, 1958; LL.B., Yale University, 1961; J.S.D., University of Mexico, 1967.
'Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
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type security interests in inventory, which carried with them a claim
to the accounts as proceeds. And, of course, the construction mortgagee
and the assignee of accounts can have no real security if subsequent
parties can get ahead of them. A revision was needed to safeguard their
interests, especially as they are engaged in extremely important types
of financing in terms of dollar volume.
Another reason for revision was the widespread introduction of non,
conforming amendments, of which, when the Permanent Editorial Board
issued its Report No. 3 in 1966, there were no less than 337, with the
result that the uniformity of the law was in serious jeopardy. It was
then that the Board decided that a "restudy in depth" of Article Nine
was required, and it established the Article Nine Review Committee.
The members of that Committee were distinguished lawyers, most of
whom, however, were not experts in the field of secured transactions.
The actual drafting was therefore entrusted to two Reporters, Homer
Kripke and Robert Braucher, both of whom were then law school pro-
fessors. The two Reporters, in turn, were assisted, to an undefined ex-
tent, by two Consultants, Grant Gilmore and Peter Coogan, who had
gained a reputation as the nation's foremost authorities on the subject
of secured transactions by the publication of extensive treatises. After
the work of the Reporters was approved by the Review Committee, it
was passed on by the American Law Institute and the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and promulgated in May,
1972.
The process of revision appears as a scheme for dividing responsi-
bility from authorship. The critical voting was done by the Review
Committee, where the Reporters were disfranchised because they were
not members. And the nation's most outstanding experts were removed
even from the drafting process, though their views were not, and could
not have been, dispensed with. Essentially, this is the scheme that
exists in the field of public lawmaking, and which was transferred here
to legislation by a private source.
Nevertheless, two differences appear between the work of a body
like Congress and the review process of Article Nine. The first is that,
whereas the debates and hearings of public lawmakers are published,
those which led to the review of Article Nine have remained secret.
One is thus deprived of an invaluable source of information for inter-
pretation and critique. Only the most superficial glimpse at what hap-
pened can be gained by reading the General Comment on the Approach
of the Review Committee, which is appended to the Final Report sub-
mitted to the Permanent Editorial Board, a private document dated
April 25, 1971. The Reasons for Change, which accompany the new Code,
are of course wholly onesided.
The other difference between the revision process and the work
of Congress is that while Congress may, within the broad bounds of the
1973)
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Constitution, legislate what it pleases, the draftsmen of the new Article
Nine had to keep in mind the fact that they were an offshoot of the
Permanent Editorial Board which had been established in 1961, among
other things, to propose amendments to the Code, but only where "[ilt
has been shown by experience under the Code that a particular pro-
vision is unworkable or for any other reason obviously requires amend-
ment" and also in the case, which did not occur, of a change in com-
mercial practices which would necessitate a change in the law. As they
read their mandate, the participants in the revision process felt pre-
cluded from taking a fresh look at Article Nine and restructuring it as
a whole, and reduced instead to the consideration of amendments to
particular sections and subsections which had proved to be unworkable
in practice. As even an outward glimpse at their work will reveal,
they were faithful to their mandate, which means that most of the
changes are either corrections of bad draftsmanship or technical im-
provements.
The fact that the Revision consists of a series of unrelated amend-
ments rather than a restructuring of the whole, has made this study more
discontinuous than the usual law review article. For those who, despite
this warning, have decided not to turn pages until they reach the con-
clusion, I can indicate, as a guiding thread to tell them where they are,
that I plan to discuss scope, attachment, perfection, and priorities in
roughly that order.2
SCOPE OF ARTICLE NINE
a) LEASES
From its inception, Article Nine encompassed not only secured
transactions in the strict sense but also the assignment of accounts and
chattel paper, regardless of whether the assignment was an outright
sale or a transfer for security. The reason for this extended coverage
was not only the difficulty of distinguishing between the two kinds of
assignments; it was mainly the thought that the public files should
reveal the extent to which the resources of a business were obtained
through financing as opposed to capital investment. A functional rather
than a formal consideration would thus determine the content of the
files. In furtherance of this scheme, the old Code had already taken
the step of requiring the filing of consignments in cases where the se-
cured party wanted to avoid the burdensome proof that the consignment
was notorious (section 2-326) (3). The Revised Code then complements
this rule by adding a section governing the priority of the consignor's
interest vis-a-vis that of secured parties (section 9-114 of the new Code).
'See Funk, The Proposed Revision of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 26
Bus. LAW. 1465 (1971); 27 Bus. LAW 321 (1971). This article came to my attention
after my own work had been completed.
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To carry out this scheme consistently, it would have been necessary
to add to the trio security interests-assignments-consignments the leasing
of industrial equipment, and yet for no reason stated in either the old
or the new Comments, such leases are left out. The draftsmen may have
felt that this change exceeded their mandate. They only went so far
as to authorize the filing of equipment leases, in case the lessor should
fear that his "lease" later be labeled a "security interest," (section 9-
408), but the requirement of filing of leases for perfection was not
imposed.
The leasing of equipment, as a form of financing, is a much ad-
vertised and popular device. For the financer, a lease offers a double
security. The financer will, in the usual case, be financing the acquisition
by the lessor. He gets a purchase money security interest in what for
him is inventory (section 9-109 (4), or else he has a shifting security in-
terest on the lessor's present and after-acquired stock in trade. In any case,
he has the usual obligation of his debtor (the lessor), strengthened by a
security interest. But in addition to that, he also asks for and obtains
an assignment of the rental payments due from the lessee, and binds
the lessee to make such payments to him, notwithstanding any defenses
(stemming from failure to maintain the equipment) which the lessee
may have against the lessor. This insulation from defenses is accom-
plished by a clause in the lease, in which, pursuant to section 9-206, the
lessee agrees not to assert his defenses against the assignee. Thus the
financer in effect has two debtors. If he cannot collect his loan from
the lessor, he can take rents from the lessee, and, in addition to that,
he is secured by the equipment. He is not apt to suffer much in case of
bankruptcy of either the lessor or the lessee. In fact, he may be better
off than an ordinary secured creditor since, in the case of a reorgani-
zation proceeding against the lessee under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy
Act,3 he could, through the lessor, reclaim the equipment. This is some-
thing which, according to the Comment to section 9-507 and In re Yale
Express System, 4 an ordinary secured creditor is unable to do, because
Article Nine is not built around a title theory.
It cannot be denied that a lease (and I mean a real lease, not a
contract intended for security and merely labeled "lease") is a means
for financing equipment. For the businessman who does not care much
for legal niceties, it makes no difference whether he is buying and own-
ing the equipment he uses, and paying off a purchase money loan, or
whether he is leasing it and, paying the equivalent under the name of
rent. He is in possession of equipment, just as much as if he had bought
it, and since, under the old and the new Article Nine, his lessor is not
'Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §501 (1964).
'In re Yale Express Systems, 370 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1966).
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required to file, his possession is deceptive to third parties who may
wish to acquire a security interest in the equipment, buy it or levy upon
it.
If Article Nine included leases of equipment, it would be a self-
contained body of law, going beyond secured transactions in the strict
sense, and encompassing most situations in which possession is misleading
and filing is needed to correct the impression of unfettered ownership
it gives. I am not suggesting that the filing system be used every time
possession is divorced from complete ownership.
But I do think that the invention of the filing system, as applied
to chattels, should be put to full use. It is also good that it was extended
beyond security interests, to sales of accounts and chattel paper and
to consignments of goods. Beyond that, it should be required for leases
of equipment, particularly since such leases constitute forms of financing.
And I would add that the difficulty of distinguishing between real
leases and agreements characterized by the parties as leases, though
their real intent is to create a security interest, is as great as the one
of distinguishing between assignments of accounts for security and out-
right sales of accounts, which is the reason given for inclusion of such
sales under Article Nine. The cases are growing in number, in which a
judge is asked to determine the true nature of a transaction labeled as a
lease, and there is no reason why a loophole should exist in the Code
which stimulates this kind of litigation.5
b) GENERAL INTANGIBLES
Another point relating to the scope of Article Nine, for which the
new version does not remedy the ills of the old one, has to do with the
relationship between accounts and general intangibles. Sales of accounts
come within Article Nine, whereas sales of general intangibles are ex-
cluded by section 9-102. (Assignments of general intangibles intended
for security are included, however.) The distinction between an account
and a general intangible is clear enough, but it is not rational. An
account is a right to payment of money for goods sold or leased or for
services rendered (section 9-106). "General intangible" is a catch-all
expression for intangibles which are neither merged into a piece of paper
(like instruments, documents of title, chattel paper, and money) nor
constitute accounts. Hence any right to the payment of money, which
does not stem from a sale, a lease, or the performance of services, is a
general intangible. Among such rights is the right of a buyer to a refund
for returned merchandise, the right of a lender to the payment of his
loan (provided it was not embodied in an instrument), the right to
royalty payments for the use of patents and trademarks, the right to
insurance payments, to damages for breach of contract, etc. The Com-
5See Leary, Leasing and Other Techniques of Financing Equipment under the U.C.C.,
42 TEMP. L. Q. 217 (1969); Stanley v. Fabricators, Inc., 459 P.2d 467 (Alaska 1969).
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ment to section 9-106 also suggests that the compensation for the right
to exhibit motion picture and television films is a general intangible,
which assumes that the exhibition contract is not a lease of goods, but
some innominate sort of agreement. In addition to this class of intang-
ibles, which are rights to the payment of money, there is another class,
which simply constitutes intangible personal property, such as the patent
or trademark itself.
The expression "general intangible," then, includes two very differ-
ent types of assets: the first type, which is made up of miscellaneous
rights to the payment of money, has close affinity to accounts, and is
at times assigned under the same contract; the second type is composed
of patents, copyrights, and other similar rights.
It makes sense to include within the scope of Article Nine, security
interests in this second type of property, while at the same time exclud-
ing from it the sale of such items, since their sale is not a means of
financing, whereas their pledge most assuredly is. But the same thing
cannot be said of the first type of general intangible, which represents
a right to the payment of money. That type is discounted, sometimes
along with accounts in a single contract. Hence it would have been
much more rational to divide intangible property into two categories:
accounts, which are rights to the payment of money from whatever
source, and general intangibles, which are all other kinds of intangible
property.
The Review Committee considered this suggestion, but turned it
down. It expressed its views as follows:
A more limited suggestion is to rectify the definitions of "accounts"
and "general intangibles". It has been pointed out that some obli-
gations for payment of money are not accounts, but are general
intangibles, because the definition of "account" is limited to rights
to payment for goods sold or leased or for services rendered. Thus,
rights to payments constituting royalties for use of patents, copy-
rights, etc., or for exhibition rights to moving pictures and television,
seemingly constitute general intangibles rather than accounts. A
potential source of error by inadvertence thus arises. The Committee
nevertheless concluded that it would be undesirable to broaden the
definition of accounts to include all rights for the payment of money,
because too many standard forms of agreement use the term "ac-
counts" and reflect intention of the parties to include only traditional
accounts arising from the sale of goods or services, and not mis-
cellaneous rights for the payment of money.6
I find this reason wholly unconvincing. The fact that present-day
forms which are filled out to evidence assignments of accounts use the
word "account" in the sense given it by the old Code is no reason for
refusing to change the legal definition of that word. Those financers
who might wish to buy or discount all rights to the payment of money
could continue to use the word "account" in their agreements and those
who did not care to acquire such rights could amend their forms
OReview Committee for Article 9, Final Report, General Comment on the Approach of
the Review Committee for Article 9, § E-15.
1973)
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accordingly. But even if they failed to do so, no great harm would
ensue, inasmuch as they would not receive these rights unless they
paid for them, and the calculation of the discount price would reveal
the parties' true intent.
C) CONTRACT RIGHTS
One difficulty with basic concepts which was happily cured by the
Revision, has to do with the relation between an account and what the
old Article Nine calls a contract right. A contract right is defined in the
old section 9-106 as "any right to payment under a contract not yet
earned by performance and not evidenced by an instrument or chattel
paper." The difference between an account and a contract right, then,
is that an account has been earned by performance, whereas a contract
right has not. A common example of a contract right is the right of a
builder to progress payments which will not become due until the con-
struction reaches certain stages, but which are nevertheless often assigned
by the builder in order to finance the construction. Under the scheme
of the old Article Nine, when the right to payment arises under a con-
tract right, the account into which it transforms itself is proceeds of
the contract right (section 9-306(1)).
The existence of the special concept of contract rights in the old
Article Nine was justified on the ground, stated in the Comment to
section 9-106, that "there is reason to allow the original parties-assignor
and account debtor-more flexibility in modifying the underlying con-
tract before performance than after performance." This policy was car-
ried out in section 9-318, where it is laid down that the parties to the
original contract may, despite assignment, make any modification or
substitution "in good faith and in accordance with reasonable commer-
cial standards."
The new Article Nine has discarded the contract right as a separate
concept, while still preserving the policy of old section 9-318. Wherever
the expression "account and contract right" appeared in the Code, it
was replaced by the short word "account," and section 9-318 was changed
to read that whenever the right to payment of an account "has not been
fully earned by performance," the parties may make their good faith and
commercially reasonable substitutions. Thus was accomplished, not a
change in substance, but an economy of concepts and words.
Relationship between attachment and perfection.
In the way it governs the relationship between attachment and
perfection, Article Nine stands half-way between two theoretically clear
solutions: the first, which is the one used for real estate mortgages,
consists in making the agreement of the parties binding between them
without need of recordation, and in using the filing or (as it is called
in the real property area) the recording system as a means of giving
constructive notice to later purchasers. Under this system, if a purchaser
[Vol. 34
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has actual knowledge, he cannot complain about the lack of recordation,
because the recordation is only intended to give him the information
which he already has.7
The opposite system would require recordation for the validity,
even as between the parties, of the security agreement. It would be a
formality which would have to be accomplished and its effect would
be to blur any distinction between attachment and perfection.
Article Nine stands half-way between these extremes. As between
the parties, the security agreement attaches without any need for per-
fection; but filing is much more than a means of giving constructive
notice. It is also a way for the creditor to prove that he is serious about
obtaining his security interest, and hence lack of filing often prejudices
him (in the area of priorities, and under the new Code, even against lien
creditors) despite knowledge of his security interest on the part of the
third parties with whom he is competing.
In my opinion Article Nine should have gone the whole way in
its movement away from the constructive notice system and reached
the goal of perfection as a formal requisite for validity.
Essentially, the question is how much formality is desirable in a
security agreement. Formal requisities exist mainly as proof of serious-
ness, although when the formality is a writing evidentiary purposes
are served as well. Under case law prior to the U.C.C., judges had
devised two principal rules designed to ensure the seriousness of a
security agreement: the first was the requirement that the description
of the collateral in the chattel mortgage be precise and meticulous; the
other was the need, which courts imposed on secured parties, to police
their collateral. Both of these rules have been, wisely I think, abolished
(sections 9-110 and 9-205). But nothing has been put in the Code to
replace them as safeguards against the casual execution of security
agreements. The existence of a Statute of Frauds is not enough. It
allows security agreements to be inserted as boiler-plate clauses in
promissory notes, and the borrower's signature at the bottom of that
form, without any further formality on the part of anyone, is sufficient
to give the secured creditor very special rights of execution.
There is a simple means of ensuring that when the creditor obtains
the agreement, he really means to have it. That is to require him to file
a financing statement or perfect his interest in some other way. Under
such a system, filing would be a condition not only of perfection, but
also of enforceability against the debtor. The system, if it were adopted,
would therefore do away with the dichotomy between these two con-
cepts, and bring about some simplification in the overall structure of
the Code.
'The doctrine that actual knowledge prevents reliance on the lack of recordation is the
majority rule. It has been severely criticized. G. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON T'r-E LAW OF
MORTGAGES, § 206 (2d ed. 1970).
1973]
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Validity of the security agreement
"Attachment" and "enforceability" are the twin concepts used by
the old Code to describe the validity of the security agreement against
the debtor. Attachment is achieved when "there is agreement that it
[the security interest] attach and value is given and the debtor has
rights in the collateral," section 9-204 (1). Enforceability is only attained
when, in addition to compliance with the requirements for attachment,
the secured party has been put in possession of the collateral or "the
debtor has signed a security agreement which contains a description of
the collateral and, in addition, when the security interest covers crops
or oil, gas or mineral to be extracted or timber to be cut, a description
of the land concerned," section 9-203 (1) (b).
The new Article Nine groups all the requirements for validity under
one heading and says in new section 9-203, that "a security interest is
not enforceable against the debtor or third parties with respect to the
collateral and does not attach unless . . ." there is possession or a signed
security agreement, value has been given, and the debtor has rights in
the collateral.
The Statute of Frauds requirement for this enforceability is that
the debtor have signed a security agreement which contains a descrip-
tion of the collateral and in some cases also of the land, notably, under
the new Code, in the case of crops or timber, and under the old Code,
also in the case of oil, gas, or minerals.
The reason for the deletion of minerals from the requirement of a
description of the land is that they are not included within the coverage
of the Code until after they have been extracted. This is apparent under
the old Code from the fact that they are neither goods nor fixtures, and
also from section 9-204 (2) (b), which states that a debtor has no rights
in "oil, gas or minerals until they are extracted." It made no sense to
the draftsmen of the Revision to require the land to be described when
the only kind of minerals in which a Code security interest can attach
are those that have lost their character as realty.
Nevertheless, if the minerals to be financed are those which will
be extracted from a particular mine or well, an indication of the lo-
cation of that well or mine is necessary as a means of identifying the
collateral. The rules on filing of the corresponding financing statement
lend support to this requirement. See section 9-401.
The question which has come up in several cases and received a
non-uniform answer, whether the Article Nine Statute of Frauds is
satisfied if the debtor signs such a financing statement, has been left
by the Revision in its present state of doubt.8
8See G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY, 347-348 (1969), (re-
quirement satisfied); contra: Mid-eastern Electronics, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of
S. Md., 380 F.2d 355 (4th Cir. 1967); M. Rufkin Electric Supply Co., Inc. v. Burdette
[Vol. 34
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The better view in my opinion is that the signing of any writing,
whether labeled security agreement or financing statement, should be
sufficient for purposes of enforceability. After all, in substance there
is no difference between a security agreement and a financing state-
ment. A financing statement is nothing but a short-form security agree-
ment which was invented to save space in the files. Hence the new
section 9-203 should have provided that a security interest is enforce-
able if, inter alia, the debtor has signed a "writing" (instead of a "se-
curity agreement") which evidences his intent to secure a debt and
contains a description of the collateral and, in some cases, also a descrip-
tion of the land.
Under both the old and the new Article Nine, a security interest,
once having attached, may continue in proceeds and after-acquired
property. In view of the fact that these extensions of the security
interest are enforceable against the debtor without regard to per-
fection, I shall treat them now, while bearing in mind that in the usual
case such interests are in fact perfected, and the claim of the secured
creditor is disputed by a third party, not by the debtor.
Attachment of Proceeds
a) INSURANCE PROCEEDS
Proceeds are defined as "whatever is received when collateral or
proceeds is sold, exchanged, collected or otherwise disposed of." Section
9-306(1). The two words missing in this enumeration are "damaged
or destroyed," and from that omission it could be inferred that insurance
proceeds are not "proceeds." To resolve this problem the new Article
Nine provides that "insurance payable by reason of loss or damage to
the collateral is proceeds, except to the extent that it is payable to
a person other than a party to the security agreement." Section 9-306(1).
These words are addressed to the situation where the debtor or the
secured party has procured the insurance. They leave in doubt the
question, which is especially important in the case of automobiles which
are damaged or destroyed by a third person, whether the cause of
action against the tortfeasor or his insurer can be claimed by the
secured party as proceeds. If the tortfeasor is insured, the question
is whether the insurance is "payable" to the debtor under the new
phrasing; if he is uninsured, it becomes a matter of extending the
concept of proceeds beyond the area of insurance by means of an
analogy which I think is called for, though not at all spelled out. It
would have been better simply to add the words "damaged or destroyed"
to the enumeration of what constitutes proceeds, instead of framing
Electric, Inc., 98 N.J. Super. 378, 237 A.2d 500 (1967); American Card Co., Inc. v.
H.M.H. Co., 97 R.I. 59, 196 A.2d 150 (1963). See also In re Center Auto Parts, 6
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 398 (D.D. Cal. 1968) and Safe Deposit Bank and Trust Co. v. Ber-
man, 393 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1968).
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a special rule for cases of insurance only. This defect in the new Code
can, however, be remedied by inserting in the security agreement a
clause whereby the debtor assigns his causes of action for damage or
destruction of the collateral, to the secured party.
b) THE NEED TO CLAIM PROCEEDS
Next arises the question: is it necessary to claim proceeds in the
security agreement or does a right to proceeds arise by operation of
law, subject to an agreement of the parties to the contrary? Section
9-306 (2) of the old Article Nine states plainly that "a security interest
...continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received
by the debtor." Standing by itself, the section leaves no room for argu-
ment, and yet in section 9-203 there appears the phrase that "in describ-
ing collateral, the word 'proceeds' is sufficient without further descrip-
tion to cover proceeds of any character." Apart from being superfluous,
this phrase throws into doubt the rule of section 9-306 (2). What
need is there to tell the prospective parties to a security agreement
that the magic word is "proceeds" when there is no need to claim
proceeds in the first place? Still further darkness is shed on this question
by the form of a financing statement, which the draftsmen had the kind-
ness to supply practising lawyers in section 9-402 (3) and on which
appear the lines: "(If proceeds or products of collateral are claimed)
Proceeds-Products of the collateral are also covered."
Again, what need is there to claim proceeds in the financing state-
ment if the right to them arises by operation of law? Fortunately, this
question did not arise very often, because secured creditors immediately
formed the habit of checking the little box on the financing statement
in order to claim proceeds.
The new Article Nine has eliminated the inconsistency of the old
one on the question of claiming proceeds, and has laid down the simple
rule that "unless otherwise agreed a security agreement gives the
secured party the rights to proceeds provided by section 9-306." The
decision to make a claim to proceeds implicit in a security agreement
was based on the existing practice of invariably claiming them. The
new rule thus not only accords with the probable intent of contracting
parties, but reduces the complexity of security agreements and the
problems which arise under the old Code from an inadvertent failure
to check the little proceeds box on the financing statement.
c) NEED TO CLAIM "PRODUCTS"?
One mystery remains to be solved about the financing statement
under the new Code. It stems from the fact that, although the word
"proceeds" has been eliminated, the word "products" remains. This word
is nowhere defined and the only place it is used is in the form of the
financing statement. Under the old Code, it might be explained away
as a synonym of proceeds, since anyone who checked the proceeds box
[Vol. 34
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would be getting "proceeds or products." But under the revision, where
"products" stand alone to be checked off, they appear to mean some-
thing else. If they are, in a literal sense, those things which are produced
by the collateral, then we are in for some big surprises. The crops
produced by a tractor, the woolens produced by a knitting machine,
the sheet metal produced by a steel press, in short, the inventory
manufactured with equipment could simply be claimed by the equip-
ment financer by checking off the "products" box, without further
particulars. But inasmuch as this reading is totally absurd, the best
that can be hoped for is that the word "products" has no meaning and
hence that the "products" box on financing statements should be
eliminated.
d) CASH PROCEEDS OUTSIDE INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS
A further question relating to proceeds is the extent of the prop-
erty they cover. A difficulty arises with respect to cash proceeds which
have been deposited in a bank account and there commingled with the
debtor's other funds. To be claimed, proceeds must be identifiable
(section 9-306 (2)), and the question arises whether proceeds which
have been commingled are nonetheless identifiable. Neither the old nor
the new Article Nine provide an answer to this question, except in the
case in which an insolvency proceeding (such as a bankruptcy proceed-
ing, equity receivership or statutory assignment for the benefit of credi-
tors) has been instituted against the debtor. In substance, the rule for
these proceedings, given in section 9-306 (4), is that the secured creditor
may claim as proceeds only the amount which was deposited in the
debtor's bank account during the ten days prior to the institution of
the proceeding.
But suppose that a general creditor levies on the debtor's bank
account without instituting an insolvency proceeding, and that the
secured creditor intervenes to assert that a part of that bank account
is proceeds of collateral by which he was secured. We are faced with
two possible solutions. The first would simply consist in saying that
proceeds which have been commingled are not identifiable, thus ruling
against the secured creditor. The second would be to say that if the
secured creditor gets some commingled cash proceeds in bankruptcy,
he ought to get at least as much outside of bankruptcy. However,
subsection (4) of section 9-306 is intended as an exception for insolvency
proceedings only, and hence cannot be applied by analogy to the non-
insolvency, everyday judicial proceeding. That leaves open only one
possibility, which is to let the secured creditor have- as proceeds all
the cash that is traceable to his collateral and was deposited, minus the
amounts thereof which the debtor may have already disposed of. For
the determination of the net amount of cash, a formula such as "first
in, first out" might be employed.
I find it amazing that both the old and the new Article Nine should
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have minutely regulated cash proceeds in the case of insolvency pro-
ceedings, yet left them wholly untouched outside of that area. The num-
ber of inconsistent cases on the tracing of proceeds is large enough
.to make the problem inescapable.
Attachment of after-acquired property
There is good reason for allowing after-acquired property clauses
to be inserted in security agreements. Their function is to make possible
the floating security on inventory and accounts. A creditor secured by
present and after-acquired inventory loses some of his security every
time an item is sold to a buyer in the ordinary course of business; to
make up for that loss, he gains a security in inventory newly acquired to
replace the item that was sold. Thus, he has a right which covers the
inventory at whatever level it may stand at a particular time. The same
can be said of the assignee of accounts, whose mass decreases whenever
an account is collected under a non-notification method whereby the
debtor makes his own collections and may keep the proceeds. It in-
creases whenever a new account arises from a sale of merchandise. Since
under these sorts of arrangements the value of the security fluctuates,
the security agreement most often calls for fresh advances or repay-
ments to be made so that the amount of the indebtedness remains in a
constant ratio to the collateral.
a) FUTURE CROPS
There are also cases where the after-acquired property clause serves
no useful purpose and is in fact detrimental to the public interest. Under
the old Article Nine, there are two cases in which an after-acquired
property clause is void: when it covers crops which are more than one
year in the future, unless given in connection with a lease or land pur-
chase or improvement loan, and when consumer goods are being fi-
nanced (section 9-204(4) (a) and (b)).
The rule on future crops was of course intended to protect the
farmer from greedy lenders by preventing him from mortgaging his
crops for the future and putting himself in a position where he cannot
obtain financing for later current crops. But the old Article Nine also
makes it possible to evade this wise and sensible provision, not only in
land purchase and improvement contracts, for which an exception is
specifically made, but also in all other cases. The way around the rule
is to make the farmer come in every year to get an extension on his note,
at which time he must execute a new security agreement on his current
crop. Priority for the new loan is already assured by the notice filing
made at the time of the original loan. In the end, the rule creates paper-
work without helping the farmer.
I suppose that if farmers had been as well represented as banks in
the revision process, the prohibition on mortgages of future crops
would have been strengthened, on account of the vital importance for
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farmers to be able to obtain financing for the planting and harvesting
of a current crop, despite bad previous years which might have put
them in default to their former lenders. But for a bank, the important
thing is to be secured with as many of the debtor's assets as possible.
In the end, therefore, the prohibition on future crop mortgages was com-
pletely wiped out.
b) FUTURE EQUIPMENT
Under the new Code there is only one area in which after-acquired
property clauses are void, and that is the area of consumer goods. But
what about goods which are neither inventory (for which the clause
serves a good purpose), nor consumer goods? In particular, what about
agricultural and industrial equipment? Is there any reason for allowing
after-acquired property clauses covering such equipment? In most
cases, equipment is financed on a purchase money basis and the financer
relies only on the item sold in extending credit. Yet he usually has, as a
precaution or out of habit, inserted an after-acquired property clause
in his security agreement. He thus takes priority as to equipment on
which he never relied, against other creditors who furnished the means
of purchasing it, provided they are for some reason, such as an inadvert-
ent failure to file, unsecured. He also obtains privileged rights of exe-
cution against the debtor as to property which he never furnished.
Some recognition is given to this factor by section 9-108. It states
that after-acquired property is deemed to secure an antecedent debt, and
hence is voidable in bankruptcy if acquired during the four months pre-
ceding the date of filing of the petition and at a time when the secured
creditor knew his debtor was insolvent 9 unless it is either acquired in
the ordinary course of business or pursuant to the security agreement and
within a reasonable time after the advance was made. Thus only two
kinds of after-acquired property are bankruptcy-proof even during the
four-months period: after-acquired inventory, because it is acquired
in the ordinary course of business, and after-acquired equipment which
was specifically contemplated in the security agreement and quickly
obtained.
It seems to me that the same reasons that militate against the validity
of the "just in case" variety of after-acquired property clause in bank-
ruptcy also work against it outside of that particular proceeding. The
only justification for the privilege implicit in a security interest is the
incentive it gives the financer to extend credit. Thus there is no reason
to provide him, by means of a boiler-plate clause in his security agree-
ment, with a right on which he does not rely, and in fact cannot rely,
because the equipment contemplated by the clause may never be acquired.
In short, I find cause for regret in the fact that the revision does not
void after-acquired property clauses covering uncontemplated equipment,
just as it voids them in cases of consumer goods.
"Bankruptcy Act, § 60, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1964).
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Attachment and perfection for crops, timber, minerals, and fixtures
Article Nine is primarily intended as a security law for chattels, yet
it touches upon some types of property which are on the borderline be-
tween realty and personalty.
a) Cnops
Growing crops are attached to the soil, yet under both Article Two
and Article Nine of the Code, they are treated as if they were goods.
A present sale of crops can be made before severance (section 2-107 (2))
and a security interest in them can be created in that state, since "goods"
are defined to include growing crops (section 9-105 (f) of the old Code
and 9-105 (h) of the new one). Then a problem arises-how to resolve
the conflict between these chattel interests in the growing crops and
the real estate rights of mortgagees and grantees?
In the case of a sale of growing crops, the rule laid down in section
2-106 (3) is that a grantee or mortgagee who has recorded his right
prior to the sale prevails over the buyer of the crops, and that if the
buyer wishes to prevail against future mortgagees and grantees, he
has to record his purchase in the realty records.
The rule for security interests is different. The place to file a crop
mortgage, under both the old and the new Article Nine is in the chattel
files which, depending upon the "alternative" chosen by the state, is
either the office of the Secretary of State (alternative one) or the
county office where the debtor has his residence and also where the
land is situated (alternatives two and three). Section 9-401.
J
The arguments made in the General Comment for not harmonizing
the crop mortgage rule with the crop sale rule are that to do so would
make it more cumbersome to mortgage crops, since a "legal description"
of the land would have to appear in the mortgage and that it would,
in most states, disturb the existing practice of filing crop mortgages in
the chattel records. These reasons are not convincing, because the ques-
tion whether a "legal description" is needed could have been made
optional for each state in the case of crop mortgages, just as it is in
the case of timber, minerals, and fixtures in section 9-402 (5). The dis-
turbance of existing practice is not too high a price to pay for a con-
sistent and viable system.
Indeed, the rule on crop mortgages is doubly inconsistent: not only
does it not coincide with the rule on crop sales, but it also differs
from the rule on timber and fixtures. What's more, filing crop mort,
gages in one place and other realty interests in another doubles the
effort neeeded for a realty search on agricultural land, and leaves up
in the air the problem of priority between crop lenders and other realty
interests. The Review Committee was fully aware of this gap, since
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in paragraph B-5 of its General Comment it declared: "The Committee
has not thought it possible in the Uniform Code to deal with the diver-
sity of existing state law on the interrelation of chattel security interests
in growing *crops and real estate interests." Among the problems left
unsolved are the following: Is a real estate mortgage in which crops
are claimed, perfected as to the crops if it is filed only in the realty
records? If so, does it have priority over a later crop mortgage filed
in the chattel records? Does a grantee of the land, who has actual know-
ledge of an unfiled crop mortgage, prevail over the crop mortgagee?
And does a crop lender, who has actual knowledge of an unrecorded
sale or encumbrance of the real estate, prevail over the real estate
party? Would a crop mortgage be perfected if it were mistakenly filed
in the realty records? I think that enough problems have been posed
to show that there is only one sensible way to resolve priorities between
crop mortgages and realty rights in crops, and that is to have a single
filing place for all such rights, which, of course, would have to be the
real estate records.
b) TIMBER
The system established by the new Code for uncut timber is, I
think, the right one, and it should have been applied to growing crops
as well. Uncut timber under the new Code is no longer realty for pur-
poses of sales law, and the change which was thus brought about is the
only important departure by the Review Committee from its concern
with Article Nine (section 2-107). Timber is also "goods" for purposes
of Article Nine (section 9-105), and thus both a sale and a mortgage
of uncut timber can be effectuated under the simpler formalities of the
law of chattels. Neverthless, for perfection, timber deeds and timber
imortgages must be filed in the realty records (section 2-107, 9-401 (1)
and 9-403. (7)). It may seem inconsistent to describe timber as person-
alty and provide for the filing of interests in it in the realty records,
yet this solution contains in it the best of both worlds-it facilitates.
timber transactions by subjecting them to the rules devised for chattels,
and yet it affords protection to competing real estate interests through
the. requirement of a realty filing.
The third parties against whom a timber filing gives protection
are not only persons With interests in the real estate, but all other
persons Who assert adverse rights in the timber alone. With respect to
timber mortgages, this conclusion can be derived from the fact that
the filing in the realty records has the same effect as a filing in the
chattel'records. With respect to timber sales, the rule emerges from
the words of section 2-107 (3) which grant effectiveness to such sales
"subject to any third party rights provided by the law relating to
realty records." Although the point is not free from doubt, I believe
that those rights are not only the rights of real estate parties, but also
rights of others which are perfected by filing in the realty records, in,
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eluding timber mortgagees, and the rights of lien creditors, to the extent
that under state law they would prevail over buyers of the land who
had not recorded their deeds. 10
e) MINERALS
Unharvested crops and uncut timber are "goods," but unextracted
minerals are real property. No Article Nine security interest can attach
in them until they leave the ground. The new definition of "goods"
in section 9-105 clearly makes this point by saying that goods "does not
include ... minerals (including oil and gas) or the like before extraction."
The old Article Nine makes the same point differently, by providing in
section 9-204 (2) that "the debtor has no rights . . . in oil, gas or minerals
until they are extracted. . . ." But a security interest often attaches to
minerals the minute they are extracted, and hence two questions arise.
Must the land from which they are obtained be described in the security
agreement and financing statement? And must the filing take place
in the realty records or the chattel records?
In answer to the first question the inference from the new section
9-203 (1) (a) is that a description of the land is not required. Here
the draftsmen went too far in changing the old Code. The old Code
provides that the security agreement must describe the land in the case
of "oil, gas or minerals to be extracted." The last part of the statement
is misleading since it assumes that a security interest in unextracted
minerals can arise under the Code. But instead of simply deleting that
phrase, the Review Committee should have replaced it with one which
requires the land to be described when the security interest attaches
to minerals as they are extracted, as a means of identifying the col-
lateral.
This defect is, however, cured by the requirement that the land be
described in the financing statement. The reason for the requirement
is the rule that security interests in extracted minerals must be filed
in the realty records (new section 9-402 (5)). Here we encounter the
same paradox as in the case of uncut timber, a security interest in prop-
erty characterized as goods must be filed in the realty records. A dif-
ference does, nevertheless, exist. Uncut timber is still very firmly con-
nected to the soil, and hence its characterization as goods is a fiction
indulged in to facilitate transactions relating thereto; but minerals
which have already been extracted are truly goods. The reasons for the
real estate filing has to do with the practice of selling the minerals at
the wellhead or minehead. The owner of the production who is not the
mining or petroleum company itself, but merely an investor, sells his
minerals as they are extracted to the company. The lender who financed
his acquisition of the production rights, finds himself secured by the
-
00n the protection afforded by real property recording acts to creditors, 8ee OSBORNE,
supra note 7 at § 210.
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account receivable as soon as this sale has taken place. Hence it is
really the account that the draftsmen had in mind; but since the pro-
duction rights are typically divided into fractional rights and their
owners are spread around the country, it would have made no sense
to follow the usual rule for accounts, which is to file at the assignor's
residence. That left the place where the well or mine is located as the
only feasible place to file, and the decision to choose the realty records
in place of the chattel records was made simply on the basis of existing
practice.
d) FIXTURES
Everyone knows the meaning of such words as "crops," "timber,"
and "minerals." But what is a fixture? The old Article Nine proclaims
in section 9-313 (1) that a fixture is whatever "the law of this state
other than this Act" determines to be such. The new Article Nine has
discarded this simple approach, and sets about, not to define the word
"fixture," but to say which kinds of fixtures it is concerned with. Thus
building materials which are incorporated into the land may be fixtures
for some purposes, but section 9-313 (2) specifies that no security inter-
est can be created in them.
At the opposite extreme, objects described as "readily removable
factory or office machines or readily removable replacements of do-
mestic appliances" can be fixtures under local law (section 9-313 (4)
(c)), although no fixture filing is needed for priority in them, even over
real estate parties.
In addition to these two extreme types of fixtures, there is of course
the broad in-between area, in which the decision whether a thing is a
fixture will depend on how it is characterized by the law of each state.
This reference to the general law of the state is found in section 9-313
(1) (a) of the new Code which says: "Goods are 'fixtures' when they
become so related to particular real estate that an interest in them
arises under real estate law." Whether, for example, a prefabricated
steel shed, a window air conditioner or a mobile home is a fixture, is a
question the answer to which may not be uniform. Nor is there a need
for uniformity, because the conflict between Article Nine security inter-
ests and real estate interests can only arise if the disputed object is a
fixture by state law.
In other words, the fact that a thing is a fixture under the Code's
use of the word doesn't mean that a security interest can attach in it
(there can be no security interest in building materials) ; nor does the
fact that a thing is a fixture mean that a fixture filing in the realty
records is required (no such a filing is required for readily removable
machines, etc.) Thus the word "fixture" becomes very confusing. One
has to ask what kind of a fixture is involved before one can find
the applicable rule. And there are three kinds of fixtures: building
materials incorporated into the land, which are outside the scope of
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Article Nine; certain readily removable machines and consumer goods,
which are within the scope of the Article, but as to which no fixture
filing is called for; and a number of other fixtures, for the determin-
ation of which one must look to state law.
One of the gravest defects of the old Article Nine and one of the
principal reasons why it needed to be revised, is that it makes no pro-
vision for a fixture filing, that is, a filing of a security interest in fixtures
in the realty records. The old rule is that a filing of security interests
in fixtures must take place in the office where a mortgage on the land
would be recorded (section 9-401), and most officers in charge of re-
cording mortgages understandably read that expression as meaning
that they had to keep a new book in their office for the filing of secur-
ity interests in fixtures. A search of the real estate records therefore
does not, under the old system, reveal the existence of encumbered
fixtures. A double search has to take place for complete information on
the state of the property.
The new Article Nine does away with this duplicity and establishes
the principle that a fixture filing must be in the realty records, so
that a search of the title will reveal what fixtures, if any, located on
the land are subject to security interests.
The fixture filing requirement applies to all fixtures covered by
the Code (i.e., all fixtures except building materials) with the exception
of "readily removable factory or office machines or readily removable
replacements of domestic appliances which are consumer goods." Sec-
tion 9-313 (4) (c).
A new group of problems is thus created in the area which I shall
describe in a manner consistent with the Code, though admittedly self-
contradictory, as "readily removable fixtures." It is clear that the ques-
tion of what is readily removable is one which must be decided by
applying the words of the Code, not pre-Code cases on real estate
matters. It is a question to which a uniform answer must be given.
Thus, for example, if a state decision holds that a machine bolted to the
floor is a fixture, it cannot be followed to decide whether or not it is
"readily removable" under Article Nine. The decision will have to be
that it is readily removable. The Review Committee preserved the label
"fixture" for these things precisely in order to allow the old cases to
continue to govern in other areas, while substituting a new test under
Article Nine.
Two types of things are susceptible of being "readily removable
fixtures": factory or office machines and replacements of domestic
appliances which are consumer goods. To begin with the factory or
office machines: Why did the draftsmen choose the word "machines"
instead of falling back on the familiar notion of equipment? The unde-
fined word "machine" is not at all so clear as might seem at first sight,
besides which there is no reason for distinguishing between removable
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machines and other removable equipment, such as, for example, a work-
bench or a vise (assuming that a vise is not a machine) or a window air
conditioner (assuming that it isn't an office machine).
Turning now to consumer goods: for a security interest in them
to be exempt from a fixture filing, they must be removable, replacement
appliances. Thus no less than three conditions must be met: the con-
sumer goods must be appliances; they must be replacements; and they
must be removable. The rules on consumer goods appear stricter than
the ones on equipment, for which there are only two requirements, namely
that they be machines and removable ones.
Why are only appliances exempt from fixture filing, assuming they
comply with the other two requirements? I assume the word "appliance"
is synonymous for "machine," i.e. that an appliance is a household ma-
chine. Therein may lie the explanation of why only appliances are
exempted. But, that does not mean that the distinction between appli-
ances and other consumer fixtures is the right one. The effect of the
rule is that security interests in curtains, ceiling lamps, built-in hi-fi
equipment or rugs nailed to the floor, if they are fixtures by real
estate law, are subjected to fixture filings, whereas stoves, refrigerators,
water heaters, etc., even if they are fixtures by real estate law, are
exempt from fixture filings as long as the other requirements of being
replacements and removables are met.
Next, why need the consumer appliances be replacements? Why are
not original consumer appliances exempt from fixture filings as well?
To these questions the last paragraph of Comment 4 (d) to section 9-313
provides the answer. The draftsmen had in mind the priority contest
between a construction mortgagee and a later purchase money financer
of consumer goods. Their aim was to make the construction mortgagee
safe from the danger that the building contractor, after the house had
been mortgaged together with all its fixture appliances, would buy and
install original fixtures subject to higher-ranking purchase money inter-
ests. The means of achieving this end was to require a fixture filing for
original appliances before the filing of the construction mortgage. Under
the rule, therefore, any mortgagee contemplating financing a home con-
struction can know from a search of the realty records exactly which
interests may be superior to his and can rest assured that no later
interest will come ahead of him.
I shall have more to say about construction mortgages when I reach
the subject of priorities. At this point, it is sufficient to point out that
the requirement of a fixture filing for original appliances exists only for
the sake of protecting the construction mortgagee. Therefore, despite
broader wording, it appears to me that no fixture filing of original
appliances is needed in a conflict with real estate parties other than
construction mortgagees. Such parties, who can be later grantees or
later mortgagees or even prior non-construction mortgagees, take sub-
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ject to a conflicting security interest in any removable domestic appli-
ances, be they original or not. To state the matter differently, a fixture
filing is, generally speaking, required only for non-removable domestic
appliances, as well as all other consumer fixtures; however, for purposes
of priority over construction mortgagees, a fixture filing is also required
for those removable appliances which are original and are considered
fixtures by property law.
All would be well, were it not for the fact that the field of consumer
appliances is not covered by the two words "replacements" and "orig-
inals." There are certain consumer appliances which are not installed
in a house when it is built and yet do not replace other, worn out appli-
ances either. Such objects might be called additional appliances. Is a
fixture filing required for them in a case of conflict with a construction
mortgagee? There is much more similarity between additions and replace-
ments than between additions and originals, since a construction mort-
gagee relies only on originals, and cannot foresee the existence of either
replacements or additions. Hence, in my judgment, no fixture filing is
necessary for additional removable appliances.
After having thus stated the rule, it is necessary to state why it
exists. Why is there the requirement of a fixture filing for removable
original appliances and not for removable original factory or office
machines? The answer lies in the fact that construction mortgages often
cover the construction of a home and its appliances to the extent that
they are fixtures; whereas separate financing is usually obtained for
office and factory machines or, if the same lender is involved, a separate
security agreement is customarily entered into.
To recapitulate: there is no such thing as a fixture for purposes
of Article Nine. The word "fixture" is used in the sense which local
law may give to it. The correct question is: when is a fixture filing
required? It is not required for all fixtures. For purposes of priority
against real estate parties in general, it is required for all fixtures
except removable machines and removable appliances. But for purposes
of priority against construction mortgages, it is also required of remov-
able original appliance-fixtures.
And to take a long view of everything said so far concerning prop-
erty which lies at the boundary between chattels and realty: a filing
in the real estate records (called a fixture filing in the case of fixtures
and otherwise without a special name) is required for security interests
in standing timber, extracted minerals and all fixtures encompassed
by Article Nine with the exception of "readily removable fixtures"
other than original domestic appliances when the real estate party is a
construction mortgagee. On the other hand, security interests in crops
are, mistakenly I think, excluded from the requirement of a realty
filing, and no rules whatsoever are given to resolve the problems of
priority between crop mortgagees and real estate parties.
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e) ERRoNEous FILING
Two more questions remain: First, what is the effect of making
a chattel filing when a realty filing is required? Such a mistake in
filing on the part of a creditor is understandable, inasmuch as he does
not always know to what use the debtor will put the thing sold.
For fixtures, the answer is provided in section 9-313 (4) (d) : even
a chattel filing is good enough to defeat a lien creditor. This principle
constitutes a valuable departure from the old Code, under which the
proper place to file a security interest in fixtures is in the office where
real estate mortgages are filed (section 9-401), from which it follows
that no filing elsewhere is of any use at all, not even against lien cred-
itors. The reason given for this change in Comment 4 (c) to section 9-
313 is that "generally a judgment creditor is not a reliance creditor who
would have searched the records."
But on this point, the rule for timber and extracted minerals is dif-
ferent from the rule on fixtures. A chattel filing of such interests is
totally devoid of effect. The reason for the special rule on fixtures,
which is to prevent total loss to the secured party who guessed wrongly
about the affixation of the thing, does not apply to timber or extracted
minerals. Their nature is not subject to unforeseen changes.
Second, what is the effect of a fixture filing made by the secured
party with the expectation that the goods would become fixtures, when
in fact the debtor fails to install them? Would the secured party be
protected against judicial liens? He would be if the security interest
could, in the words of section 9-313 (4) (d), be considered "perfected
by any method permitted by this Article." But is recording in the realty
records a method of perfection permitted by "this Article" for security
interests in chattels?
I hesitate to give a negative answer to this question, especially for
the case in which the debtor has indicated that he would use the goods
as fixtures, or in which the goods are normally used only as fixtures.
A negative answer means that a person selling goods destined to become
fixtures, if he wants to be fully secure from the time of delivery onward,
has to either spy on the debtor to be sure that the goods have been in,
stalled or else file doubly, first in the chattel records and then in the
realty records. There is no indication that the Code imposes such a
burden of double filing. What is more, in the converse situation in
which the creditor has filed in the chattel records in spite of the fact
that the goods have become fixtures, the new Code generously allows
perfection against lien creditors (section 9-313 (4) (d)), and the Com-
ment even goes so far as to hope that this chattel perfection of realty
will stand up in bankruptcy under the lien creditor test applicable to
personal property (Comment (c) to section 9-313). Bearing in mind
this policy of leniency toward the purchase money creditor, the better
view, and the view which, I think, should have been made explicit, is
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that a fixture filing of goods destined to become fixtures is effective
against lien creditors even though the chattel is, contrary to expectation,
belatedly or never installed on the land.
f) TRANSMISSION UTILITIES
A broad exception to the requirement of a fixture filing in the realty
records of the place where the fixture is situated, is given for so-called
transmitting utilities, which are defined casuistically in section 9-105 (n)
as railroads, suppliers of electricity or oil or gas by pipeline or the pro-
vision of sewer service. What these companies all have in common is
the fact that they own fixtures laid out as rails, pipelines, or other pipes
or wires, throughout various counties and states, and it would be a hard-
ship to require a local fixture filing in each county where they own
fixtures. The rule was therefore established in section 9-401 (5) that
one filing per state is enough, and that it must be made in the office
of the Secretary of State. Such a filing is a fixture filing as well as a
chattel filing, and should be placed in a special filing system set up for
the purpose.
Perfection in general
There are four ways to perfect a security interest, not all of which
are, however, usable for all types of property. They are: the taking of
possession, filing, noting on a certificate of title, and enjoying a secret
security interest. Secret security interests are tolerated for a variety of
reasons: to give a seller or his financer time to file (section 9-301 (2));
to allow short-term trust receipt transactions to take place without clut-
tering the files (section 9-304 (4) and (5)); and to relax requirements
in non-commercial situations (section 9-302 (1) (c) and (d)).
a) CONSUMER GOODS
The most important case in this last category is, of course, the
purchase money security interest in consumer goods, which can, under
the old as well as the new Code, be perfected without filing or taking
possession, unless the consumer goods are "motor vehicles required to be
registered" section 9-302 (1) (c). If there is a certificate of title law
on the books, perfection must be by notation on the certificate (section
9-302 (3) (b)); otherwise it must be by filing. An improvement would
have been achieved, had the draftsmen used the expression "goods re-
quired to be registered" instead of "motor vehicles," because (as they
realized when they wrote the Comment to the conflict of laws section
(section 9-103), where they do use the broader term "goods") certificate
of title laws usually cover trailers, mobile homes, and sometimes even
boats, as well as motor vehicles.
Let me now face a hard question: How true is it that security
interests in consumer goods need not be filed? The best way to find an
answer is to give the various exceptions to section 9-302 (1) (d) which
states the broad no filing rule.
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First of all, as the quoted section shows, non-purchase money inter-
ests in consumer goods are subject to filing.
Second, there is a requirement of filing or notation on a title cer-
tificate for all motor vehicles and other goods required to be registered.
Third, consumer goods which are not removable are subject to the
requirement of a fixture filing, not for perfection, but for priority over
real estate parties.
Fourth, original domestic appliances are subject to a fixture filing
for priority over construction mortgagees.
And fifth, under section 9-307 (2) which has remained unchanged
in the revision, filing is required for superiority over consumers who
have bought the goods for their own personal, family or household
purposes.
This multiplicity of exceptions and provisos is a good illustration
of the sophisticated approach used by the draftsmen. In the most im-
portant cases, filing is required for one purpose or another, and hence
the general rule is seriously misleading. The exceptions erode the whole
policy of not cluttering the files with consumer transactions, because
any financer who takes his security interest seriously is going to file,
simply because the rules on when to file are beyond his comprehension.
If this is so, the whole system should be changed, and consumer goods
should be treated like equipment for filing purposes.
b) Low COST AGRICULTURE EQUIPMENT
In addition to consumer goods, the old Article Nine provides that
agricultural equipment with a purchase price of not more than $2,500
can be the subject matter of a secret purchase money security interest.
This rule was intended to help the farmer, by making it less cumbersome
for those who sell him small equipment to have perfected security inter-
ests. The intent was misguided, because sellers of equipment do not
need such an incentive to induce them to make their sales. And the
effect of the provision, far from helping the farmer, was actually to
damage his credit, because he was in some cases unable to use his
already acquired equipment as collateral for a loan since his lender had
no assurance that a secret purchase 'money security interest was not
burdening it. For this reason the provision was abolished in the new Code.
C) INTANGIBLES
In the area of intangibles, a rule of the new Code makes explicit
that a security interest created in a beneficial interest in a trust or de-
cedent's estate is exempt from filing because of its unusual and non-
commercial character.
In addition, the assignment of accounts which may be a part of a
general assignment for the benefit of creditors is explicitly exempt from
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filing in the new Code (section 9-302 (1) (g)) ; the same is true implicitly
under the old Code, since the assignor does not seek financing in that
sort of a transfer.
d) KNOWLEDGE OF UNPERFECTED SECURITY INTERESTS
Once perfection has been accomplished by any means, it strengthens
the rights of the secured party in various degrees, depending on the
priority attained. But as a bare minimum, it assures precedence over
lien creditors and transferees outside the ordinary course of business
and, in the case of accounts and general intangibles, any subsequent trans-
ferees (section 9-301 (1)). But what rights does the unperfected security
interest confer against these parties?
An important change was made in the new Article Nine for the
case of lien creditors. The old rule is that even an unperfected security
interest confers priority over a lien creditor who had knowledge of the
security interest at the time he obtained his lien (section 9-301 (1) (b)).
The new rule is that the unperfected security interest loses out in all
cases against the lien creditor. The new rule is an aspect of the shift
toward more cases of required filing and more direct consequences for
failure to file, which shows itself in the new Code.
And yet, for no apparent reason, the element of knowledge has
been retained for the case of transferees outside the ordinary course,
transferees of accounts, and general intangibles. The equities that assist
them are, if anything, stronger than those of the lien creditor, and it
seems to me that if a lien creditor with knowledge can, under the new
Code, prevail over an unperfected security interest, a transferee outside
the ordinary course or a transferee of accounts or general intangibles
should also prevail despite his knowledge. Abolishing the knowledge
requirement for a lien creditor is, in effect, to pass judgment on the
secured creditor who has not gone to the trouble of perfecting his
security interest. It assumes that he was not serious enough about having
it, for if he really wanted to be secure, he would have perfected. But
if that is the case, then he should be subordinated, not only to the know-
ing lien creditor, but to all later transferees, with or without knowledge
of his flimsy security interest.
In fact, I would declare the unperfected security interest void even
against the debtor himself, because a creditor who does not trouble
himself with the formalities of perfection, in cases where those formali,
ties exist, does not deserve the special privileges of execution which a
security interest confers.
Perfection of proceeds
We have already seen what proceeds are and discovered that under
the new Article Nine they need not be claimed in the security agreement
or financing statment. The issue now is: How does one perfect a
security interest in proceeds?
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a) SECURITY INTERESTS PERFECTE) BY FILING
The old Article Nine gives an exceedingly simple and convenient
answer: if, as is invariably the case under present-day practice, the
creditor has claimed proceeds by checking off the little box on his
financing statement, he has a perfected security interest in proceeds.
The idea behind this rule is that since he has claimed proceeds on his
financing statement and this statement is on file, there is constructive
notice of his right to proceeds. The fallacy behind it, however, is that
it assumes that the place for filing the original collateral is also the
place for filing for proceeds. This is not the case if, for example, the
original collateral was inventory (for which filing generally is in the
state where the collateral is situated) and the proceeds are accounts
(for which filing is at the place where the assignor keeps his records).
Furthermore, the proceeds may not be susceptible of filing at all. Such
is notably the case with regard to instruments, a security interest in
which can only be perfected by the creditor's taking possession. It
makes no sense to allow a security interest perfected by filing to exist
in this kind of property simply because it constitutes proceeds.
The rules of the new Article Nine meet these objections, and provide
(section 9-306 (3)): First, if the proceeds are of a kind for which the
original filing is appropriate, no reperfection is needed. There is no
need to claim the proceeds in the financing statement, since such a
claim is now clearly implicit. In fact, there is even no need that the
description of the original collateral be sufficient to identify the pro-
ceeds, except in the case where the proceeds were bought with cash
proceeds and are thus indirect. For example, if the financing statement
covers automobiles, and the debtor, a dealer in this hypothesis, sells one
of them for chattel paper, the secured party has a perfected security
interest in the chattel paper despite the fact that the financing statement
contains no mention of it. Second, in other cases, the secured creditor
enjoys a secret security interest for a period of ten days, during which
he must file or take possession of the proceeds if he wishes his security
interest to continue perfected thereafter. Third, for cash proceeds an
exception was made to these two basic principles. If a financing state-
ment has been filed, the security interest in identifiable cash proceeds
continues perfected indefinitely as a secret security interest. However,
cash proceeds do not remain in that state very long anyway. If they
are not paid over to the secured creditor, they are soon spent as a part
of the business.
b) SECURITY INTERESTS PERFECTED WITHOUT FILING
How long, if at all, does the claim to proceeds remain perfected
when the security interest is perfected without filing? Two situations
are likely to arise: The first would be one in which the secured party
and the debtor have engaged in a trust receipt transaction for which,
under section 9-304 (4) or (5), the creditor's interest remains perfected
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for twenty-one days. Suppose that after only five days the debtor has
sold the merchandise and now has an account. Does the creditor's
security interest in this account remain perfected for the remainder of
the 21 days, or does he have only ten more days from the date of con-
version of the merchandise into proceeds in which to file a financing
statement? This point is covered by an addition to the Comment to
section 9-304, which states:
Finally, it should be noted that the 21 days applies only to the
documents and to the goods obtained by surrender thereof. If the
goods are sold, the security interest will continue in proceeds for
only 10 days under Section 9-306, unless a further perfection occurs
as to the security interest in proceeds.
This comment is supported by section 9-306 (3) (c), which continues
the security interest in the original collateral into the proceeds only
if the right in the proceeds as such was perfected during the ten day
period. Yet its effect, as applied to a trust receipts transaction, is un-
fortunate. Bankers in possession of trust receipts are given a secret
security interest, precisely because of the short duration and frequency
of their transactions and of the policy decision not to clutter the files.
They understand that their debtors will sell the document or the mer-
chandise represented thereby, and thus that an account or chattel paper
will arise. But they do not know precisely when each sale will take
place, and hence, under the rule spelled out in the Comment, they will
have to file within ten days of their transactions with regard to the
accounts or chattel paper. Thus the policy of facilitating trust receipt
transactions and not cluttering the files is seriously undercut.
The rule of the Comment does, however, work to the benefit of the
secured creditor in some cases, since there is nothing to prevent him
from tacking both periods of secretly perfected security interest to one
another. In the most extreme case, if the debtor sells the goods at the
very end of the twenty-one day period, the creditor gets a total of thirty-
one days in which to file as to the proceeds.
And in some cases, the rule set forth in the Comment does not re-
quire the bank to file in respect to proceeds at all. Those are the cases
in which the account, which arises out of the sale of the merchandise
secured by the trust receipt, does not alone or in conjunction with other
accounts transfer a significant part of the outstanding accounts of the
debtor (section 9-302 (e)). Here, the security interest in the account is
perfected before the expiration of the ten day period, as required by
section 9-306 (3) (c) for proceeds. And there is no requirement, either
in the section just quoted or in the Comment under discussion, that the
perfection in proceeds be by filing. It can be by any means appropriate
for the kind of things of which the proceeds happen to consist.
For the case of consumer goods, as to which there is also perfection
without filing or taking possession, I see no problem, because the pro-
ceeds of consumer goods are likely to be either other consumer goods
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(in the case of trade-ins), or cash proceeds, or isolated general intangibles
(insurance proceeds in particular), as to which filing is not required
under the policy of section 9-302, especially subsections (c) and (e).
Protection of buyers of goods, instruments, and chattet paper
a) Buvims OF GOODS
The rule for the protection of buyers of goods given in section 9-307
remains unchanged in the Revision. Two points in it deserve discussion.
The first is that, as an exception to the general rule, buyers in ordinary
course of farm products do not take free of the security interest created
by the farmer. As is apparent from paragraph B-9 of the General
Comment, the Review Committee debated whether or not to delete this
anomalous exception on which it found feelings running very strong.
The Committee realized that the better view would be to delete it, yet
it dared not effect a change in the section, for fear of widespread non-
conforming amendments as the new Article Nine was passed by state
legislatures. It did go so far as to recommend an optional amendment,
but the Permanent Editorial Board decided against making this recom-
mendation. The main reason preventing the change is the fact that the
federal government, which is an important crop lender, insists on pre-
serving its security interest in crops against buyers and auctioneers,
which is given to it by federal common law." It would be absurd indeed
to have the federal government prevail against good faith buyers of
farm products and let other lenders lose. Yet so long as the U.C.C.
remains unchanged on this point, the federal common law rule is not
likely to change either. Here it was the peculiar structure of our fed-
eral system which prevented a necessary reform from being carried out.
The other point on which a change should have occurred, but upon
which the General Comment is silent, is the requirement that the se-
curity interest, of which the buyer in ordinary course is free, be one
created by the seller and not by some third person. The problem is likely
to arise only in the case of second hand goods bought by consumers,
and the effect of the present rule unfortunately is to let the financing
institution prevail over the consumer who, since he is buying a second-
hand product, is not apt to be among the financially favored members
of society. Suppose that a bank finances the purchase of an automobile
in a state that does not have a certificate of title law; that the buyer then
trades it in or sells it to a dealer other than the one from whom he
purchased it, who then resells it to another consumer. The second con-
sumer is clearly a buyer in the ordinary course of business, since he is
buying from a dealer (section 1-201 (9)), yet he loses against the bank
under section 9-307, because the only security interest of which the con-
sumer takes free is one created by his seller, and this particular security
interest was created by the first buyer of the automobile. Is one to
2See the authorities cited in U.S. v. McCleskey Mills, Inc., 409 F.2d 1216 (5th Cir. 1969).
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search the files now every time one buys a used car from a dealer? If
so, under the name of which debtor would one look in his search? Is
the bank not well enough protected by its security interest in the pro-
ceeds of the sale by the first buyer and its action of conversion against
the dealer, which is also a secured right to proceeds? 12
The existing rule has only one advantage: it is consistent with
the rules on the entrusting of goods to a merchant, found in section
2-403 (2). Not everyone who buys in ordinary course from a merchant
prevails under this section either, but only those who are fortunate
enough to buy goods which the person with the right to possession
actually entrusted to the merchant. There is no rule in the United
States protecting all buyers in ordinary course, similar to the one on
"market overt" found in section 22 of the English Sale of Goods Act, 13
though in my view such a rule would be desirable.
b) PURCHASERS OF INSTRUMENTS
When it comes to the protection of purchasers of instruments, the
old Article Nine contains an inconsistency. If the instrument stands
alone and is not a part of chattel paper, section 9-309 requires that the
purchaser be a holder in due course, and if he knew that a secured
party was claiming the instrument as proceeds of inventory, he would
not qualify as such and the rights of the secured party would be stronger
than his. However, if the instrument was a part of chattel paper, he
would prevail under section 9-308, which provides: "A purchaser of
chattel paper who gives new value and takes possession of it in the
ordinary course of his business has priority over a security interest
in chattel paper which is claimed merely as proceeds of inventory
subject to a security interest, even though he knows that the specific
paper is subject, to the security interest."
The new Article Nine has eliminated this inconsistency by widening
the scope of protection of section 9-308 to include not only purchasers
of chattel paper, but purchasers of simple instruments as well. Both
now prevail over the security interest in proceeds of inventory regard-
less of knowledge. This rule exists in order to allow the debtor to col-
lect or discount the proceeds before accounting for them to the secured
party or using them in his business, if the security agreement so
provides.
The second installment of this article which will appear in the next
issue of this law review, will deal with the entangled subject of priori-
ties (with an emphasis on fixtures), and with the new rules on future
advances, on where to file, and on conflict of laws.
12See New England Merchants National Bank v. Auto Owners Finance Co., 355 Mass.
487, 245 N.E.2d 437 (1969).
"Sale of Goods Act, 56 & 57 Vict., ch. 71 (1892).
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